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ness," and for this reason there does seem to be a necessity for
determining under which article and for what cause the interdiction was obtained. This view is in accord with that of Chief
Justice O'Niell's dissent in the instant case where he states that,
when the court is dealing with a will made by a person interdicted under Article 422 there is no need to determine what the
rule would be if a person under interdiction for insanity (Article
389) had made a will. In the Lanata case the interdiction obtained
under Article 422 certainly does not prove anything regarding
the testator's state of mind. It is not at all clear why the deceased
had been interdicted, the only certain fact being that he was not
interdicted for mental incapacity. Therefore, the facts present no
reason why any inquiry should be made as to the mental condition
of testator at the time the will was-executed. Although the court
held that interdiction under either Article 389 or Article 422
would not in itself invalidate a will, it seems that the door is still
open with regard to the validity of a will executed after judgment of interdiction under Article 389 has been rendered.
B. A. G.

TRADE MARKS AND TRADE NAMES-EFFECT OF VIOLATION OF

FICTITIous NAME STATUTE-The plaintiff organized a group of
independent cab operators Under the name of "Checker Cabs"
and had them paint their cabs in the same fashion. The defendant, two years later, incorporated under the name of "New Orleans Checker Cabs, Incorporated," and this suit was brought to
enjoin him from conducting a taxicab business under that name.'
The defendant contended (1) that the defendant was prior regis2
trant under the General Corporation Laws of Louisiana, and (2)
that the plaintiff failed to comply with a Louisiana statute which
prohibits the carrying on of any business under an assumed name
8. Art. 1788, La. Civil Code of 1870; Iolland v. Miller, 12 La. Ann. 624
(1857): "It is not the judgment of interdiction therefore, that creates the
incapacity, it is evidence only of its existence, but it is conclusive evidence."
1. The parties litigant are reversed herein for convenience of discussion.
In fact, New Orleans Checker Cabs, Inc., the later user of the name, was
plaintiff, and suit was for an injunction against the prior user, Mumphrey.
Mumphrey set up a reconventional demand. Judgment was adverse to plaintiff and was in favor of defendant on his reconventional demand. The present discussion Is concerned with this latter aspect of the case; and for this
reason Mumphrey is regarded throughout as plaintiff.
2. La. Act 250 of 1928, as amended by La. Act 65 of 1932 and La. Act 34
of 1935 (4 E.S.) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1080-11541.
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without first having registered such name.3 Neither contention
was sustained and an injunction was granted, but damages were
refused. New Orleans Checker Cabs, Incorporatedv. Mumphrey,
18 So. (2d) 629 (La. 1944).
The defendant's first contention was easily disposed of. Registration under the act 4 is designed to prevent confusingly similar
corporate names. The state's action in allowing incorporation
under a particular name is only permissive. The purpose of the
act is to prevent confusion and it is not to aid one person in passing off his goods or services as those of another. Even though the
name is acquired through the authority of the state it cannot be
used in a manner which will result in fraud or deception.5 Furthermore, the Louisiana Business Corporation Act provides:
"Nothing in this section shall abrogate or limit the law as
to unfair competition or unfair practice in the use of trade
names, nor derogate from the principles of law or equity, or
the statutes of this State or of the United States with respect
to the right to acquire and protect trade names."
The first user of a trade mark or a trade name can prevent a
later use by another of a confusingly similar mark or name in
connection with the same commodity or service. As the court
points out in the principal case,' this right exists independently
of all state and federal statutes.
The defendant's second contention is more plausible. Through
the application of the equitable doctrine of "clean hands," courts
will refuse to protect a trade name which is being used by the
plaintiff to deceive the public." Also they usually refuse to protect an illegal or immoral business against unfair competition.
This is illustrated by one case in which the plaintiff sold intoxicating malt liquors,9 and another which involved the sale of con3. La. Act 64 of 1918, as amended by La. Act 303 of 1926 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) §§ 6503-6507]. .
4. La. Act 250 of 1928, as amended by La. Act 65 of 1932 and La. Act 34
of 1935 (4 E.S.) [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 1080-1154].
5. Children's Bootery v. Sutker, 91 Fla. 60, 107 So. 345 (1926).
6. La. Act 250 of 1928, as amended by La. Act 65 of 1932 and La. Act 34
of 1935 (4 E.S.) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1083].
7. New Orleans Checker Cabs, Inc. v. Mumphrey, 18 So. (2d) 629 (La.
1944).
8. Mulhens & Kropff, Inc. v. Ferd. Muelhens, Inc., 43 F. (2d) 937 (C.C.A.
2d, 1930); New York & New Jersey Lubricant Co. v. Young, 77 N.J. Eq. 321,
77 Atl. 344 (1910).
9. Portsmouth Brewing Co. v. Portsmouth Brewing and Bottling Co., 67
N.H. 433, 30 At. 346 (1893). Bill dimsissed on the theory that the owner of
property has a right to protection in any legal use or business in which he
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traceptives. 10 Since these traffics were prohibited by law, relief
against infringement was denied. In the instant case it is contended in effect that plaintiff committed a continuing misdemeanor by his failure to comply with the registration statute.
The argument of the defendant is not that the plaintiff's business
is illegal, but that he is conducting a lawful business in an unlawful manner.
Analogous is the stiuation in which a foreign corporation does
business in a state without first securing a license. Thus in
General Film Company of Missouri v. General Film Company of
Maine" the federal court held that an infringer of a trade mark
cannot set up failure by complainant to comply with the licensing
statute as a defense; the state alone can complain thereof. 12 If
the first user is in violation of the law he can be punished in the
proper forum.'8 In one case,' 4 however, the court sustained the
defense of failure to secure such a license. This case can be distinguished on the ground that the later user adopted the name
innocently. It was held that the failure of the foreign corporation (first user) to register resulted in deception. The loss must
be borne by the one whose conduct gave rise to the situation.
This reasoning has no application in the instant case, where the
defendant was aware of the plaintiff's prior use.
It is necessary to look into the purpose and operation of the
statute invoked by the defendant. It was enacted to prevent the
adoption of a fictitious name for the purpose of securing credit
without informing the public of the true identity of the persons
with whom it deals. Thus it protects against fraud. Similar statutes exist in many other states 5 and have been widely interpreted as having the same object. The rule appears to be well
may be employed but if the owner chooses to engage in illegal business he has
no legal claim upon the court to aid him by protecting his property.
10. Youngs Rubber Corp., Inc. v. C. I. Lee & Co., Inc., 45 F. (2d) 103
(C.C.A. 2d, 1930). On appeal the decision was reversed and cause remanded
for further proceedings so that the plaintiff might introduce new evidence
that sales injured by the defendant's infringement were not illegal.
11. 237 Fed. 64 (C.C.A. 8th, 1916).
12. The same reasoning was applied in Sterling Products Corp. v. Sterling
Products, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 548 (S.D. N.Y. 1942).
13. Mills v. Industry Novelty Co., 230 Fed. 463 (N.D. Ill. 1916).
14. Mutual Export & Import Corp. v. Mutual Export & Import Corp. of
America, 241 Fed. 137 (S.D. N.Y. 1917).
15. Ala. Code Ann. (Michie, 1928) § 4156; Ariz. Rev. Code Ann. (Struckmeyer, .1928) §§ 2497, 2498; Ga. Code (1935) §§ 106-301-106-304; Idaho Code
Ann. (1932) §§ 52-501-52-507; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §§ 50-201-50-203;
Iowa Code (1935) §§ 9866-al-9866-a4; Ky. Stat. Ann. (Carroll, 1936) §§ 199b-1199b-5; Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) §§ 9825-9829; Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) §§
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settled that statutes of this kind are subject to strict interpretation since they are in derogation of the common law 6 and are
penal in character. 7 For these reasons businesses conducted without compliance are not illegal per se, and contracts of such businesses are generally regarded as enforceable in the absence of
deception or other injury from non-compliance. Louisiana has
beeh consistent in this attitude.'8 Prior to 1927, the courts of
Kentucky adopted the contrary view, 19 and a similar position has
been suggested in lower court decisions in Pennsylvania. 0 Under
this minority view it might be maintained with some plausibility
that a business conducted in violation of the statute is unlawful
and, like the illegal traffic in liquor, hereinabove referred to, will
not be protected against the tort of unfair competition. The Kentucky view, however, has been abandoned in that state,2 ' and is
universally repudiated elsewhere.
The generally accepted view is that failure to comply with a
fictitious name statute does not preclude an action for tort. 22 Recovery has been allowed for conversion, 2 trover, 4 and personal
injury.25 Louisiana, as well as other states, has allowed the main26
tenance of an action for defamation.
7346-7352; Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) §§ 8019-8024;
Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer, 1929) §§ 4450-4459; N.C. Code Ann. (Michie, 1935)
§§ 3288-3292; Ore. Code Ann. (1930) §§ 70-301-70-306; Tenn. Penal Code, Arts.
1067-0070; Va. Code Ann. (Michie & Sublett, 1936) § 4722(1).
16. Uhlmann v. Kin Daw, 97 Ore. 681, 193 Pac. 435 (1920); Sutton v. Coast
Trading Co., 49 Wash. 694, 96 Pac. 428 (1908).
17. McArdle v. Thames Iron Works, 96 App. Div. 139, 89 N.Y. Supp. 485
(1904); Jennette v. Coppersmith, 176 N.C. 82, 97 S.E. 54 (1918); Lamb v. Condon, 276 Pa. 544, 120 Atl. 546 (1923).
18. Smith v. Williams, 152 La. 948, 94 So. 859 (1922); Toelke v. Toelke,
153 La. 697, 96 So. 536 (1923).
19. Hunter v. Big Four Auto Co., 162 Ky. 778, 173 S.W. 120 (1915).
20. Ferraro v. Hines, 77 Pa. Super. 274 (1921).
21. Hayes v. Providence Citizens' Bank & Trust Co., 218 Ky. 128, 290 S.W.
1028 (1927).
22. Wood v. Erie Ry. Co., 72 N.Y. 196 (1878).
23. Lawrence v. Beattie, 209 Mich. 128, 176 N.W. 570 (1920); Barton y.
Thompson's Estate, 225 Mich. 40, 190 N.W. 682 (1923).
24. Tucker v. Adams, 63 N.H. 361 (1885).
25. Mytinger v. Waldrip, 290 S.W. 777 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926). This case
does not involve parties who failed to register a name but failed to file a
certificate of withdrawal. The withdrawing partner was not held liable for
a debt of the partnership incurred through personal Injury to an employee
because, the court said, the intent of the legislature was to protect those who
might extend credit to the business and not to impose an additional punishment upon such individuals by making him liable for all claims and causes
of action, regardless of whether the failure contributed to the liability or not.
26. Naihaus v. Louisiana Weekly Publishing Co., 176 La. 240, 145 So. 527
(1933); Kornblum v. Commercial Advertisers Ass'n, 164 N.Y. Supp. 186 (1917);
Fechner v. A. H. Belo & Co., 283 S.W. 926 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
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On similar reasoning it has been properly held that operations in violation of fictitious name statutes do not preclude recovery for unfair competition 2 7 and the principal case, -which
reaches the same conclusion, is supported by both reason and
precedent.
F.M.
27. Devlin v. Peek, 135 Fed. 167 (S.D. N.Y. 1904); affirmed in 144 Fed.
1021 (C.C.A. 2d, 1906).

